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JRF DeskUGC NET, PhD, JRF & SET

Economics · Unit 1

Micro Economics

Revision notes (26 min read), then 60 real questions from UGC NET papers, 8 of them with an official key we dispute.

Official syllabus · Unit 1

  • Theory of consumer behaviour
  • Theory of production and costs
  • Decision making under uncertainty; attitude towards risk
  • Game theory: non-cooperative games
  • Market structures, competitive and non-competitive equilibria and their efficiency properties
  • Factor pricing
  • General equilibrium analysis
  • Efficiency criteria: Pareto optimality, Kaldor–Hicks and wealth maximisation
  • Welfare economics: fundamental theorems, social welfare function
  • Asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard

Verbatim from the UGC NET Bureau syllabus.

How often it is asked

PaperQuestions
December 20257 Jan 202613 / 100
June 202529 Jun 202511 / 100
June 2024 (re-exam)28 Aug 202416 / 100
December 202312 Dec 202320 / 100

Average 15.0 questions (30 marks) per paper. Unit tagging is ours.

Scope: consumer and producer theory, risk, non-cooperative games, market structures, factor pricing, general equilibrium, efficiency and welfare criteria, asymmetric information. Notation: x = quantity, p = price, m = income, u = utility.


1. Theory of Consumer Behaviour

Approaches

  • Cardinal utility. Gossen (1854) stated the laws of diminishing MU and equi-marginal utility; Jevons, Menger and Walras (1871–74) led the marginal revolution; Marshall's Principles came out in 1890. Equilibrium: MUx/Px = MUy/Py = MU of money. Marshall assumed a constant MU of money, which lets the demand curve be derived from the MU curve.
  • Ordinal / indifference-curve approach. Edgeworth (1881) introduced indifference curves and Pareto (1906) used them for ordinal analysis. Hicks & Allen, "A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value" (Economica, 1934), set out the ordinal approach. Hicks's Value and Capital (1939) is the standard statement. Slutsky (1915) decomposed the price effect.
  • Revealed preference. Samuelson (1938) introduced it; WARP = weak axiom. Houthakker (1950) added SARP (strong axiom, transitivity), which is enough for integrability. The approach needs no introspection and uses observed choices only.
  • Characteristics approach. Lancaster (1966, JPE): consumers get utility from the characteristics of goods.
  • Other topics: Engel's law (1857: food share falls as income rises); Veblen (1899, conspicuous consumption); the Giffen paradox (named by Marshall in the 3rd edition of Principles, 1895); Stone–Geary linear expenditure system (Stone 1954); AIDS (Deaton & Muellbauer 1980).

Indifference-curve properties. Indifference curves (ICs) slope downward, are convex to the origin (diminishing MRS) and never intersect; a higher IC means higher utility. These rest on the preference axioms: completeness, transitivity, reflexivity, continuity, monotonicity (non-satiation) and convexity.

  • MRSxy = −dy/dx = MUx/MUy. Equilibrium: MRSxy = Px/Py (tangency), with ICs convex at that point (second-order condition).
  • Special cases: perfect substitutes give straight-line ICs (corner solutions). Perfect complements (Leontief) give L-shaped ICs, so the substitution effect is 0. Quasi-linear utility u = v(x) + y gives an income effect on x of 0, so CS = CV = EV.
  • Price-consumption curve (PCC) traces equilibria as Px changes and gives the demand curve. Income-consumption curve (ICC) traces equilibria as income changes and gives the Engel curve.

Duality toolkit (Varian, MWG)

  • UMP: max u(x) s.t. p·x = m, giving Marshallian demand x(p,m) and indirect utility V(p,m).
  • EMP: min p·x s.t. u(x) ≥ u, giving Hicksian (compensated) demand h(p,u) and the expenditure function e(p,u).
  • Roy's identity: xi = −(∂V/∂pi)/(∂V/∂m). Shephard's lemma: hi = ∂e/∂pi.
  • Identities: e(p, V(p,m)) = m; h(p,u) = x(p, e(p,u)).
  • Marshallian demand is homogeneous of degree 0 in (p, m) (no money illusion). The expenditure function is concave in p, and the Slutsky substitution matrix is symmetric and negative semi-definite, so own substitution effect ≤ 0.

Slutsky equation (price effect = substitution effect + income effect)

  • Hicksian form (compensation holds utility constant, Hicks 1939; infinitesimal change): ∂xi/∂pj = ∂hi/∂pj − xj·(∂xi/∂m). Own-price case: ∂xi/∂pi = ∂hi/∂pi − xi·∂xi/∂m.
  • Slutsky form (compensation holds purchasing power constant, Slutsky 1915: the original bundle stays just affordable). For a discrete change (Varian, Intermediate, Ch. 8): Δx1 = Δx1^s + Δx1^n, where Δm = x1·Δp1 and Δx1^n = −(Δx1^m/Δm)·x1·Δp1. In rate form: Δx1/Δp1 = Δx1^s/Δp1 − (Δx1^m/Δm)·x1.
  • Under Slutsky compensation the consumer can reach a higher IC than the original. For infinitesimal changes the two forms coincide.
  • Elasticity form: εij = εij^h − sj·ηi, where sj is the budget share of good j and ηi is the income elasticity of good i.
  • How goods behave:
    • Normal good: substitution effect (SE) and income effect (IE) reinforce each other, so demand slopes downward.
    • Inferior good: IE opposes SE, but SE is larger, so demand still slopes downward.
    • Giffen good: inferior, and IE > SE, so demand slopes upward. Giffen ⇒ inferior, but inferior does not imply Giffen.

Welfare measures

  • Consumer surplus: Dupuit (1844), Marshall (1890).
  • Compensating variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV): Hicks (1939/1942). CV uses new prices and the old utility level; EV uses old prices and the new utility level.
  • For a price fall on a normal good, EV > ΔCS > CV. For a price rise, |CV| > |ΔCS| > |EV|. All three are equal when the income effect is 0 (Willig 1976: CS is a good approximation when income effects are small).

Elasticities and adding-up. Price elasticity e = (dQ/dP)(P/Q). Engel aggregation: Σ si·ηi = 1. Cournot aggregation: Σ si·εij = −sj. Euler homogeneity: Σj εij + ηi = 0. With a linear demand curve, e = 1 at the midpoint.

Commonly tested

  • Slutsky 1915 (Italian journal Giornale degli Economisti) ↔ income–substitution decomposition. Hicks–Allen 1934 ↔ ordinal utility. Samuelson 1938 ↔ revealed preference. Houthakker 1950 ↔ SARP.
  • Lancaster 1966 ↔ characteristics approach. Veblen 1899 ↔ Theory of the Leisure Class. Duesenberry ↔ demonstration effect (macro).
  • Roy's identity ↔ V → x. Shephard's lemma ↔ e → h. Hotelling's lemma ↔ profit function → supply.
  • Giffen good: inferior with IE > SE. Under perfect complements SE = 0; with quasi-linear utility IE = 0.
  • Hicksian demand always slopes downward. Marshallian demand can slope upward (Giffen).

2. Theory of Production and Costs

  • Production function Q = f(L, K). APL = Q/L; MPL = ∂Q/∂L. MP cuts AP at AP's maximum.
  • Three stages (law of variable proportions). Stage I runs to max APL. Stage II runs from max APL to MPL = 0 and is the only rational stage. In Stage III, MPL < 0.
  • Isoquants have slope MRTS_LK = MPL/MPK. Ridge lines join the points where MPK = 0 and MPL = 0, and bound the economic region.
  • Least-cost combination: MRTS = w/r, i.e. MPL/w = MPK/r. The expansion path joins the tangencies; for a homothetic production function it is a ray from the origin.
  • Returns to scale. f(tL, tK) = t^n f(L, K): n > 1 gives increasing returns to scale (IRS), n = 1 constant (CRS), n < 1 decreasing (DRS).
  • Euler's theorem: for a function homogeneous of degree n, L·fL + K·fK = n·Q.
  • Elasticity of substitution (Hicks 1932, Theory of Wages; also J. Robinson 1933): σ = d ln(K/L) / d ln(MRTS).
FunctionFormσNotes
Cobb–Douglas (1928, AER)Q = A·L^α·K^β1α+β = returns to scale; α, β = output elasticities; under CRS and competition, α = labour's share
LeontiefQ = min(aL, bK)0fixed proportions, L-shaped isoquants
LinearQ = aL + bK∞perfect substitutes
CES (Arrow–Chenery–Minhas–Solow 1961)Q = A[δK^−ρ + (1−δ)L^−ρ]^(−v/ρ)1/(1+ρ)ρ→0 gives CD; ρ→∞ gives Leontief; ρ→−1 gives linear
  • Technical progress (Hicks). At a constant K/L: labour-saving if MPK/MPL rises; capital-saving if it falls; neutral if it is unchanged.

Costs

  • TC = TFC + TVC. AC = AFC + AVC. MC = dTC/dQ = w/MPL. AVC = w/APL.
  • MC cuts AVC and AC at their minima. Because AFC keeps falling, min AC lies to the right of min AVC.
  • Long-run AC (LAC) is the envelope of SACs (Viner 1931). Under IRS, LAC touches each SAC to the left of that SAC's minimum. Only at the minimum of LAC is LAC tangent to the minimum of an SAC (the optimum plant).
  • Economies of scale: internal and external (Marshall). Modern theory: an L-shaped LAC, with reserve capacity and a minimum efficient scale (Andrews 1949; empirically Johnston 1960).
  • Duality: c(w, Q). Shephard's lemma gives conditional factor demand xi = ∂c/∂wi. Hotelling's lemma gives y = ∂π/∂p and xi = −∂π/∂wi.
  • Economies of scope: C(q1, q2) < C(q1, 0) + C(0, q2).
  • Subadditivity of the cost function defines natural monopoly (Baumol 1977).

Commonly tested

  • Cobb–Douglas 1928 ↔ σ = 1. ACMS 1961 ↔ CES. Hicks 1932 ↔ elasticity of substitution.
  • A Cobb–Douglas function is homogeneous of degree α+β. The rational stage is Stage II. Viner ↔ envelope curve.
  • Euler's theorem ⇒ product exhaustion under CRS (see Section 6).

3. Decision Making under Uncertainty; Attitude towards Risk

  • St Petersburg paradox: D. Bernoulli (1738) resolved it with a log utility function (expected utility rather than expected value).
  • Expected utility theory: von Neumann & Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944). Axioms: completeness, transitivity, continuity, independence. EU = Σ pi·u(wi). vNM utility is unique up to a positive affine transformation (cardinal in this restricted sense).
  • Risk attitudes:
    • Risk averse: u concave, u(E[w]) > E[u(w)] (Jensen's inequality).
    • Risk neutral: u linear.
    • Risk loving: u convex.
  • Certainty equivalent (CE): u(CE) = E[u(w)]. Risk premium = E[w] − CE, which is > 0 for a risk-averse agent.
  • Arrow–Pratt measures (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1965/1971):
    • Absolute risk aversion: rA = −u''(w)/u'(w). CARA: u = −e^(−aw).
    • Relative risk aversion: rR = −w·u''(w)/u'(w). CRRA: u = w^(1−ρ)/(1−ρ); u = ln w gives rR = 1.
    • DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion) is the plausible case.
    • Approximation: risk premium ≈ ½·σ²·rA.
  • Insurance. A risk-averse agent offered an actuarially fair premium (premium = expected loss) buys full insurance.
  • Friedman–Savage (1948, JPE): a utility function that is concave, then convex, then concave explains why the same person buys insurance and lottery tickets. Markowitz (1952) refined the argument.
  • Portfolio choice: Markowitz (1952) mean–variance analysis; Tobin (1958) separation.
  • Stochastic dominance.
    • First-order (FOSD): F(x) ≤ G(x) for all x. Every agent with increasing u prefers F.
    • Second-order (SOSD): every risk averter prefers F. Hadar–Russell (1969); Rothschild–Stiglitz (1970) defined "increasing risk" as a mean-preserving spread.
  • Anomalies:
    • Allais paradox (1953): violates the independence axiom.
    • Ellsberg paradox (1961): ambiguity aversion.
    • Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Econometrica): reference dependence, loss aversion, a value function concave over gains and convex over losses, and probability weighting.
    • Knight (1921): risk has known probabilities; uncertainty does not.

Commonly tested

  • Bernoulli 1738 ↔ St Petersburg paradox. vNM 1944 ↔ expected utility. Friedman–Savage 1948 ↔ insurance plus gambling.
  • Arrow–Pratt ↔ −u''/u'. Allais ↔ independence axiom. Ellsberg ↔ ambiguity.
  • Kahneman–Tversky 1979 ↔ prospect theory (Kahneman won the Nobel in 2002).

4. Game Theory – Non-Cooperative Games

Foundations. von Neumann's minimax theorem (1928) for two-person zero-sum games; vNM (1944). Nash (1950, PNAS; 1951, Annals): every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium (NE) in mixed strategies. The 1994 Nobel went to Nash, Harsanyi and Selten.

Concepts

  • Dominant strategy: best whatever the rival does. Strictly dominated strategies can be removed by iterated elimination (IESDS).
  • Nash equilibrium: each player's strategy is a best response to the others', so no one gains by deviating unilaterally.
  • Mixed-strategy NE: each player randomises so as to make the opponent indifferent.
  • Subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) (Selten 1965): NE in every subgame; found by backward induction. It removes non-credible threats.
  • Trembling-hand perfection: Selten 1975.
  • Bayesian NE (Harsanyi 1967–68): games of incomplete information, with types and "Nature" moving first.
  • Perfect Bayesian / sequential equilibrium: Kreps–Wilson 1982.

Standard games

GamePure NENotes
Prisoners' Dilemma (Flood & Dresher, RAND 1950; named by Tucker)(Defect, Defect)Dominant-strategy equilibrium, but Pareto-inferior
Battle of the Sexes2 pure NE + 1 mixedCoordination problem
Matching PenniesnoneUnique mixed NE (½, ½); zero-sum
Chicken / Hawk–Dove2 asymmetric pure NE + 1 mixedAnti-coordination
Stag Hunt (Rousseau)2 pure NE: (Stag, Stag) payoff-dominant, (Hare, Hare) risk-dominantTrust/coordination
  • Repeated games.
    • A finitely repeated PD with a unique stage NE gives defection every period (backward induction).
    • In an infinitely repeated PD, cooperation can be sustained by trigger strategies (grim, tit-for-tat) if δ is high enough. The folk theorem says any feasible, individually rational payoff can be an equilibrium. Axelrod's tournaments (1984) showed tit-for-tat's success.
  • Paradoxes: the chain-store paradox (Selten 1978) and the centipede game (Rosenthal 1981) set backward induction against intuition. Reputation models (Kreps–Wilson; Milgrom–Roberts 1982) resolve them.
  • Zero-sum games: maximin = minimax at a saddle point (value of the game). A pure-strategy saddle point exists when the row-max-of-minima equals the column-min-of-maxima.
  • Every dominant-strategy equilibrium is an NE; the converse does not hold.

Commonly tested

  • Nash 1950 ↔ existence of mixed NE. Selten ↔ subgame perfection. Harsanyi ↔ incomplete information / Bayesian games.
  • von Neumann 1928 ↔ minimax. PD ↔ conflict between individual and collective rationality.
  • Matching pennies ↔ no pure NE. Cournot equilibrium is an NE in quantities; Bertrand in prices.

5. Market Structures, Competitive and Non-Competitive Equilibria and their Efficiency Properties

Perfect competition

  • Many firms, a homogeneous product, free entry and exit, perfect information; each firm is a price taker, so P = AR = MR.
  • Short-run equilibrium: P = MC with MC rising.
  • Shutdown point: P < min AVC. The short-run supply curve is the MC curve above min AVC.
  • Long run: P = MC = min LAC, with zero economic profit.
  • Long-run industry supply is horizontal (constant-cost industry), upward-sloping (increasing-cost) or downward-sloping (decreasing-cost).
  • Efficiency: allocative (P = MC) and productive (min AC).

Monopoly

  • MR = P(1 − 1/|e|). A monopolist never produces where |e| < 1. Profit maximum: MR = MC with MC cutting MR from below.
  • There is no supply curve.
  • Welfare loss: the deadweight triangle (Harberger 1954 estimated it as small). Tullock (1967) and Posner (1975) added rent-seeking costs; Leibenstein (1966) added X-inefficiency.
  • Lerner index (Lerner 1934): L = (P − MC)/P = 1/|e|. L is 0 under perfect competition and lies between 0 and 1 under monopoly.
  • Price discrimination (degrees per Pigou 1920):
    • 1st degree (perfect): the firm captures all CS, output is efficient and DWL = 0.
    • 2nd degree: block pricing / self-selection.
    • 3rd degree: market segmentation with MR1 = MR2 = MC. The higher price goes in the less elastic market: P1/P2 = (1 − 1/|e2|)/(1 − 1/|e1|).
  • Multi-plant monopoly: MC1 = MC2 = MR.
  • A tax on monopoly profit (lump-sum or profit tax) leaves P and Q unchanged.

Monopolistic competition (Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, 1933; cf. J. Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition, 1933)

  • Product differentiation, a downward-sloping dd curve, selling costs (Chamberlin).
  • Long-run tangency solution: AR touches LAC to the left of its minimum, giving excess capacity and P > MC with zero profit.
  • Chamberlin distinguished the dd (perceived) and DD (share) demand curves.

Oligopoly — linear demand P = a − bQ with constant MC = c:

ModelVariableOutcome
Cournot (1838)quantity, simultaneouseach firm qi = (a−c)/3b; Q = 2(a−c)/3b = ⅔ of competitive output; n firms: qi = (a−c)/[(n+1)b], Q → competitive output as n → ∞
Bertrand (1883)price, identical productP = MC with only 2 firms ("Bertrand paradox")
Edgeworth (1897)price with capacity limitsno stable equilibrium; price oscillates
Stackelberg (1934)quantity, sequentialleader (a−c)/2b, follower (a−c)/4b; Q = ¾ of competitive output; first-mover advantage
Collusion / carteljoint profit maxmonopoly output (a−c)/2b, split; unstable (each firm has an incentive to cheat)
Kinked demand (Sweezy 1939, JPE; Hall & Hitch 1939, Oxford)—price rigidity; discontinuous MR so MC can shift within the gap; explains rigidity but not how price is set
  • Competitive output = (a−c)/b; monopoly output = (a−c)/2b. Ranking of output: Bertrand > Stackelberg > Cournot > monopoly. Prices run the other way.
  • Other models:
    • Price leadership: dominant firm, barometric, low-cost.
    • Limit pricing: Bain 1956; Sylos-Labini 1957 (Sylos postulate).
    • Contestable markets (Baumol, Panzar & Willig 1982): with zero sunk costs, even a monopoly prices at AC.
    • Kalecki's degree of monopoly.
    • Managerial theories: Baumol sales maximisation (1959; constrained by a minimum profit; output > profit-max output); Marris growth (1964); Williamson managerial discretion (1964).
    • Full-cost / mark-up pricing: Hall & Hitch 1939.
  • Bilateral monopoly: price is indeterminate within a range. Monopsony: MFC > w, so the employer hires less labour at a lower wage.
  • Concentration measures: the HHI is the sum of squared market shares (10,000 = monopoly); concentration ratios CR4 and CR8.

Commonly tested

  • Cournot 1838 ↔ quantity. Bertrand 1883 ↔ price. Stackelberg 1934 ↔ leader–follower. Sweezy 1939 ↔ kinked demand.
  • Chamberlin 1933 ↔ excess capacity / selling costs. J. Robinson 1933 ↔ imperfect competition, monopsonistic exploitation.
  • Lerner 1934 ↔ L = 1/|e|. Baumol 1959 ↔ sales maximisation. Baumol–Panzar–Willig 1982 ↔ contestable markets. Bain ↔ entry barriers / limit price. Leibenstein ↔ X-inefficiency.

6. Factor Pricing

  • Marginal productivity theory (J.B. Clark, The Distribution of Wealth, 1899; Wicksteed 1894).
    • Competitive factor demand: w = VMP_L = P·MP_L. With monopoly in the product market: w = MRP_L = MR·MP_L (< VMP).
    • Monopsony: MRP = MFC > w.
    • Exploitation (J. Robinson 1933; following Pigou): monopolistic exploitation = VMP − MRP; monopsonistic exploitation = MRP − w.
  • Product exhaustion (adding-up problem).
    • Wicksteed (1894) raised it; Flux (1894) showed it via Euler's theorem.
    • If Q is homogeneous of degree 1 and each factor is paid its MP: L·MPL + K·MPK = Q, so the product is exactly exhausted.
    • Under IRS, paying MPs over-exhausts the product; under DRS there is a surplus.
    • Hicks/Samuelson resolution: in long-run competitive equilibrium firms operate at min LAC, where local CRS holds, so the product is exhausted.
  • Factor demand elasticity (Marshall–Hicks laws of derived demand): demand for a factor is more elastic when product demand is more elastic, when the factor is easier to substitute, when the factor's share is larger (Hicks's qualification: true only if σ > product demand elasticity), and when other factors are in more elastic supply.
  • Wages.
    • Subsistence theory: Ricardo; Lassalle's "iron law".
    • Wage-fund theory: J.S. Mill, recanted 1869.
    • Labour supply can bend backward when the income effect of a wage rise exceeds the substitution effect.
    • Efficiency wages: Shapiro–Stiglitz 1984.
  • Rent.
    • Ricardo (1817): differential rent from fertility and location, under diminishing returns ("corn is not high because rent is paid; rent is paid because corn is high").
    • Modern theory: economic rent = earnings − transfer earnings (Pareto; J. Robinson).
    • Marshall: quasi-rent = short-run return on fixed factors = TR − TVC.
  • Interest.
    • Senior: abstinence (1836).
    • Böhm-Bawerk: agio / time preference (Capital and Interest, 1884–89).
    • Fisher: time preference plus investment opportunity (The Theory of Interest, 1930).
    • Classical theory: S(r) = I(r).
    • Loanable funds: Robertson, Ohlin, Wicksell.
    • Liquidity preference: Keynes 1936.
    • The Hicks–Hansen IS-LM synthesis determines Y and r together.
  • Profit.
    • Clark: dynamic changes.
    • Hawley: risk-bearing (1893/1907).
    • Knight: uninsurable uncertainty (Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 1921).
    • Schumpeter: innovation (Theory of Economic Development, 1911; English edition 1934).
    • Kalecki: degree of monopoly.
  • Macro distribution. Kaldor (1956): the Keynesian/Cambridge theory, P/Y = [1/(sp − sw)]·(I/Y) − sw/(sp − sw). Under Cobb–Douglas, factor shares are constant (Bowley's law).

Commonly tested

  • Clark 1899 ↔ marginal productivity. Wicksteed 1894 ↔ adding-up. Euler ↔ product exhaustion under CRS.
  • Ricardo 1817 ↔ differential rent. Marshall ↔ quasi-rent. Knight 1921 ↔ uncertainty-bearing profit. Schumpeter ↔ innovation profit. Böhm-Bawerk ↔ agio.
  • Fisher 1930 ↔ Theory of Interest. J. Robinson ↔ monopsonistic exploitation. Kaldor 1956 ↔ Keynesian distribution.

7. General Equilibrium Analysis

  • Walras (Éléments d'économie pure, 1874): a system of n markets.
    • Walras' law: the value of aggregate excess demands sums to 0, so if n−1 markets clear the nth clears too. Only relative prices are determined; one good is the numéraire.
    • Tâtonnement: an auctioneer adjusts prices; no trading at disequilibrium prices.
  • Existence: Arrow & Debreu (1954, Econometrica), using fixed-point theorems (Brouwer/Kakutani) with convexity and continuity. McKenzie (1954) proved it independently. Debreu, Theory of Value (1959). Wald (1930s) gave early proofs.
  • Stability: Hicks (1939) imperfect/perfect stability; Samuelson (1941) dynamic stability. Gross substitutes ensure uniqueness and stability (Arrow–Hurwicz).
  • Edgeworth box (Edgeworth 1881; drawn in box form by Pareto/Bowley).
    • Contract curve: the locus of tangencies where MRS_A = MRS_B (Pareto-efficient allocations).
    • Core: allocations that no coalition can block.
    • Core-convergence (Edgeworth's conjecture; Debreu–Scarf 1963): as the economy is replicated, the core shrinks to the set of competitive equilibria.
  • 2×2×2 model (two goods, two factors, two consumers): the production contract curve gives the production possibility frontier (PPF). MRT = slope of PPF = MCx/MCy.
  • Partial vs general equilibrium: partial equilibrium (Marshall) assumes ceteris paribus; general equilibrium (Walras) captures interdependence.
  • Leontief input–output analysis (1936/1941) is an empirical, fixed-coefficient general equilibrium. Hawkins–Simon condition: the viability condition for an input–output system.

Commonly tested

  • Walras 1874 ↔ general equilibrium / Walras' law. Arrow–Debreu 1954 ↔ existence. Debreu–Scarf 1963 ↔ core convergence.
  • Edgeworth 1881 Mathematical Psychics ↔ contract curve / core. Hawkins–Simon ↔ input–output viability.

8. Efficiency Criteria: Pareto-Optimality, Kaldor–Hicks and Wealth Maximization

  • Pareto optimality (Pareto, Manuale, 1906): no one can be made better off without making someone worse off. Marginal conditions (Lerner 1934; Bator 1957 "Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization"):
    1. Exchange efficiency: MRS_xy^A = MRS_xy^B.
    2. Production efficiency: MRTS_LK^X = MRTS_LK^Y.
    3. Product-mix (top-level) efficiency: MRS_xy = MRT_xy.
  • Pareto optimality is not unique (infinitely many points on the utility possibility frontier, UPF) and ignores distribution; it makes no interpersonal comparisons.
  • Kaldor (1939, EJ) compensation test: a change is an improvement if gainers could compensate losers and still be better off. No actual compensation is needed, so it is a potential Pareto improvement.
  • Hicks (1939, EJ): a change is an improvement if losers cannot profitably bribe gainers to oppose it. Kaldor–Hicks efficiency combines the two tests.
  • Scitovsky (1941, RES) reversal paradox: both a move A→B and the reverse B→A can pass the Kaldor test (possible when UPFs cross). Double criterion: Kaldor holds for the move AND Hicks holds (the reverse move fails the Kaldor test).
  • Little (1949/1950, A Critique of Welfare Economics): the Kaldor–Hicks/Scitovsky test plus an improvement in distribution (a value judgement).
  • Samuelson (1950): an unambiguous improvement needs the whole UPF to shift outward.
  • Wealth maximization (Richard Posner; Economic Analysis of Law 1973; normative defence in "Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory", J. Legal Studies 1979):
    • The law should allocate rights and resources to maximise society's wealth, valued by willingness to pay backed by ability to pay.
    • It is closely tied to Kaldor–Hicks; Posner at times equated them, though some critics (e.g., Coleman) treat it as distinct.
    • Critics: Dworkin, Coleman; it depends on the initial distribution.
  • Coase theorem (Coase 1960, "The Problem of Social Cost", J. Law & Econ): with zero transaction costs and well-defined property rights, bargaining yields an efficient outcome regardless of who holds the right (distribution differs). Stigler named it.
  • Second best (Lipsey & Lancaster 1956, RES): if one Pareto condition cannot be met, satisfying the others is not necessarily desirable. Piecemeal welfare policy can therefore misfire.
CriterionRequiresWeakness
Paretono one worse offincomplete; status-quo bias
Kaldorgainers could compensateScitovsky reversal; hypothetical
Hickslosers can't bribesame as Kaldor
ScitovskyKaldor + Hicks (no reversal)still ignores distribution
LittleScitovsky test + better distributionvalue judgement
Posner wealth maxmaximise WTP-valued wealthwealth-weighted; ignores distribution

Commonly tested

  • Kaldor 1939 & Hicks 1939 ↔ compensation principle. Scitovsky 1941 ↔ reversal paradox / double criterion. Little ↔ distributional criterion.
  • Posner ↔ wealth maximization / law & economics. Coase 1960 ↔ social cost. Lipsey–Lancaster 1956 ↔ second best. Bator 1957 ↔ welfare geometry.

9. Welfare Economics: Fundamental Theorems, Social Welfare Function

  • Old welfare economics: Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1920); cardinal, interpersonal comparisons; welfare depends on national dividend size and distribution. New welfare economics: Pareto, the compensation tests, ordinal utility.
  • First Fundamental Theorem: every competitive equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, given local non-satiation, complete markets, no externalities and no public goods. It formalises Adam Smith's invisible hand (Arrow 1951; Debreu).
  • Second Fundamental Theorem: any Pareto-optimal allocation can be reached as a competitive equilibrium after suitable lump-sum redistribution of endowments. It additionally needs convex preferences and technology. It separates efficiency from equity.
  • Social welfare function (SWF) W = W(U1, …, Un): Bergson (1938, QJE), Samuelson (Foundations, 1947). The welfare optimum is the point where the grand UPF touches the highest social indifference curve ("constrained bliss", Bator).
    • Utilitarian (Bentham): W = ΣUi.
    • Rawlsian (A Theory of Justice, 1971): W = min(Ui), maximin, L-shaped social ICs.
    • Bernoulli–Nash: W = ΠUi.
    • Atkinson (1970): inequality aversion ε.
  • Arrow's impossibility theorem (Social Choice and Individual Values, 1951; 2nd ed. 1963). With ≥ 3 alternatives and ≥ 2 voters, no social ordering (complete and transitive) satisfies all of:
    1. Unrestricted domain (U).
    2. Weak Pareto principle (P).
    3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
    4. Non-dictatorship (D).
    • The 1951 version used a different set: positive association, non-imposition (citizens' sovereignty) and a choice-based form of IIA. The four-condition list above follows the 1963 revision, with "social ordering" stated as a separate condition (SEP).
  • Related results:
    • Condorcet paradox (1785): majority voting is intransitive (cyclical).
    • Black (1948): with single-peaked preferences, majority voting is transitive and the median voter wins.
    • May's theorem (1952): characterises majority rule.
    • Sen (1970, JPE): "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal".
    • Gibbard (1973) – Satterthwaite (1975): every non-dictatorial voting rule is manipulable.
  • Market failure:
    • Externalities: Pigou, Pigouvian tax = marginal external cost at the optimum; or Coase.
    • Public goods (Samuelson 1954, REStat): non-rival and non-excludable; efficiency needs Σ MRS = MRT (vertical summation); free-rider problem; Lindahl (1919) pricing.
    • Bator (1958): "The Anatomy of Market Failure".

Commonly tested

  • Arrow 1951 ↔ impossibility theorem (four conditions above). Bergson 1938 / Samuelson 1947 ↔ SWF. Rawls 1971 ↔ maximin. Pigou 1920 ↔ old welfare economics.
  • Sen 1970 ↔ Paretian liberal. Condorcet ↔ voting paradox. Black ↔ median voter.
  • Samuelson 1954 ↔ ΣMRS = MRT. First theorem ↔ invisible hand. Second theorem ↔ lump-sum transfers + convexity.

10. Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

  • Adverse selection (hidden information, before the contract).
    • Akerlof 1970, "The Market for 'Lemons'" (QJE): sellers know quality and buyers do not, so the price reflects average quality. Good cars exit, the average falls, and the market may unravel completely. Examples: used cars, health insurance, credit.
    • Signalling, Spence 1973 "Job Market Signaling" (QJE): the informed party moves first. Education is a costly signal; a separating equilibrium needs signal cost to be negatively correlated with productivity (single-crossing condition). Pooling equilibria are also possible.
    • Screening, Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets" (QJE): the uninformed party offers a menu of contracts.
      • There is never a pooling equilibrium.
      • The only possible equilibrium is separating: high-risk types get full insurance, low-risk types get partial insurance.
      • That separating equilibrium may not exist when the share of low-risk types is high.
    • Credit rationing: Stiglitz & Weiss 1981 (AER). Raising the interest rate attracts riskier borrowers (adverse selection) and induces riskier projects (incentive effect), so banks ration credit instead.
    • Remedies: warranties, certification, reputation, brand names, mandatory insurance, signalling, screening.
  • Moral hazard (hidden action, after the contract).
    • Arrow 1963 (AER, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care"); Pauly 1968.
    • Insured agents take less care. Remedies: deductibles, co-insurance, co-payments, monitoring, incentive contracts.
    • Principal–agent problem: Ross 1973; Jensen & Meckling 1976 (agency costs, firm); Holmström 1979 (informativeness principle). The trade-off is between incentives and insurance (risk-sharing). Mirrlees (1970s) worked on optimal incentive schemes and optimal income tax (1971).
    • Efficiency wages: Shapiro–Stiglitz 1984. Wages above market-clearing deter shirking, so unemployment acts as a "worker discipline device".
  • Mechanism design: Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson (Nobel 2007). Revelation principle; Vickrey second-price auction (truth-telling is a dominant strategy).
Adverse selectionMoral hazard
Timingbefore contractafter contract
Hiddentype / informationaction
Classic paperAkerlof 1970Arrow 1963
Remediessignalling, screeningdeductibles, monitoring, incentive pay

Commonly tested

  • Akerlof 1970 ↔ lemons. Spence 1973 ↔ signalling. Rothschild–Stiglitz 1976 ↔ screening, no pooling equilibrium. Nobel 2001: Akerlof, Spence, Stiglitz.
  • Stiglitz–Weiss 1981 ↔ credit rationing. Shapiro–Stiglitz 1984 ↔ shirking / efficiency wage. Jensen–Meckling 1976 ↔ agency costs. Holmström (Nobel 2016 with Hart) ↔ contract theory. Vickrey & Mirrlees (Nobel 1996) ↔ incentives under asymmetric information.

Last-minute 20 facts

  1. Hicksian demand slopes downward; Giffen ⇒ inferior with IE > SE.
  2. Slutsky: ∂xi/∂pi = ∂hi/∂pi − xi·∂xi/∂m. Hicks holds utility constant; Slutsky holds purchasing power constant. They are identical for infinitesimal changes.
  3. Roy's identity gives x from V; Shephard's lemma gives h from e; Hotelling's lemma gives supply from π(p).
  4. For a normal good with a falling price, EV > CS > CV. With quasi-linear utility all three are equal.
  5. σ: Cobb–Douglas = 1, Leontief = 0, linear = ∞, CES = 1/(1+ρ).
  6. Euler + CRS ⇒ product exhaustion (Wicksteed–Flux 1894).
  7. Arrow–Pratt rA = −u''/u'; risk premium ≈ ½σ²rA.
  8. Fair insurance ⇒ a risk-averse agent fully insures.
  9. Nash 1950 (existence); Selten 1965 (SPE); Harsanyi 1967–68 (Bayesian). Nobel 1994.
  10. In PD, (D, D) is a dominant-strategy NE but Pareto-inferior. Matching pennies has no pure NE.
  11. Cournot duopoly output = ⅔ of competitive; Stackelberg = ¾; Bertrand gives P = MC.
  12. Lerner L = (P−MC)/P = 1/|e|. A monopolist operates where |e| > 1.
  13. Third-degree price discrimination: higher price in the less elastic market.
  14. Chamberlin 1933: long-run tangency with excess capacity.
  15. Sweezy 1939 kinked demand explains price rigidity, not price determination.
  16. Walras' law: n−1 markets clear ⇒ the nth clears too. Arrow–Debreu 1954: existence.
  17. Pareto conditions: MRS_A = MRS_B; MRTS_X = MRTS_Y; MRS = MRT.
  18. Kaldor 1939 / Hicks 1939: potential compensation. Scitovsky 1941: reversal. Posner: wealth maximization.
  19. Arrow 1951: U, P, IIA, ND ⇒ impossibility. Sen 1970: Paretian liberal.
  20. Akerlof 1970 lemons; Spence 1973 signalling; Rothschild–Stiglitz 1976 screening (no pooling); Arrow 1963 moral hazard.

Sources

  • Varian, H. R., Intermediate Microeconomics (Slutsky decomposition, Ch. 8; CV/EV, Ch. 14) and Microeconomic Analysis (duality, Roy/Shephard/Hotelling).
  • Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, Microeconomic Theory (welfare theorems, Arrow, Rothschild–Stiglitz, Spence).
  • Koutsoyiannis, A., Modern Microeconomics (market structures, oligopoly, managerial theories, factor pricing, welfare criteria).
  • Bator, F. (1957), "The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization", AER.
  • Posner, R. (1979), "Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory", 8 J. Legal Stud. 103. Secondary discussion: https://core.ac.uk/download/159585573.pdf ; https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/posner-richard-1939
  • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Arrow's Theorem": https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arrows-theorem/
  • Original papers as cited inline (Akerlof 1970 QJE; Spence 1973 QJE; Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976 QJE; Kaldor 1939 and Hicks 1939 EJ; Scitovsky 1941 RES; Lipsey & Lancaster 1956 RES; Coase 1960 JLE).

Practice: 60 real questions

Newest papers first. Pick an option to check yourself; your progress is saved on this device.

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Q1UGC NET December 2025

In a situation of decline in price of a Giffen Commodity, we find :

Q2UGC NET December 2025

Given the demand function Q = 100 − P − P², the elasticity of demand (e_d) at price P = 5 is :

Q3UGC NET December 2025

Welfare criterion based on compensation payments is known as :

Q4UGC NET December 2025

Kinked-Demand model of oligopoly was developed by which of the following ?

Q5UGC NET December 2025

Which one of the following production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale ?

Q6UGC NET December 2025

Arrange the following theories in a chronological order.

A. Theory of limit pricing (Bain's Model)

B. Logical ordering theory of demand given by JR Hicks.

C. Cardinal utility theory of demand

D. Walras theory of general equilibrium

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q7UGC NET December 2025

Match List - I with List - II.

List - IList - II
A. |ed| for demand function D = 64 − 8P, at P = 6I. 6
B. es for supply function S = −25 + 5P, at P = 10II. 4
C. The value of MR when P = 8 and ed = 4III. 3
D. The value of MPPL when VMPL = 12 and P = 3IV. 2

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q8UGC NET December 2025

Given below are two statements : one is labelled as Assertion (A) and the other is labelled as Reason (R).

Assertion (A) : When everyone trades in the competitive market place, all mutually beneficial trades are completed and the resulting equilibrium allocation of resources are economically efficient.

Reason (R) : Even if a trade from an inefficient allocation makes everyone better off, the new allocation is not necessarily efficient.

In the light of the above statements, choose the most appropriate answer from the options given below :

Q9UGC NET December 2025

A natural monopoly occurs when :

Q10UGC NET December 2025

Monopoly Power is explained by which of the following ?

Q11UGC NET December 2025

For analysing effective rent control in the housing sector :

A. The shortage of housing is small in the short run compared to the long run.

B. The shortage of housing is large in the short run compared to the long run.

C. The effective rent control exists when a government places an effective price floor on rent.

D. The effective rent control exists when a government places an effective price ceiling on rent.

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q12UGC NET December 2025Official key disputed

Which one of the following holds true at equilibrium level of demand for labour by a perfectly competitive firm ?

Q13UGC NET December 2025Official key disputed

Given the demand function P = 80 − 3Q and cost function TC = 120 + 8Q :

A. Maximum Revenue occurs at Q = 12

B. Maximum Revenue occurs at Q = 3

C. Maximum Revenue is 528

D. Maximum Revenue is 213

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q14UGC NET June 2025

If the income effect is in the opposite direction as the substitution effect, but the substitution effect dominates, then the good is__________.

Q15UGC NET June 2025

If both input and output markets are competitive and firms are profit maximizing, then in equilibrium each factor of production earns:

Q16UGC NET June 2025

Which of the following game does not have any Nash Equilibrium?

Q17UGC NET June 2025

Lexicographic preference violates which of the following axioms of utility theory?

Q18UGC NET June 2025

Which of the followings are true pertaining to the problems of asymmetric information?

A. Sellers can deal with the problem of asymmetric information by sending buyers signals about the quality of product.

B. If a seller of a product has better information about its quality than buyer, then bad products tend to drive good products out of the market.

C. According to the efficiency wage theory, a wage lower than the competitive wage increases worker productivity by discouraging workers from shirking on the job.

D. Adverse selection arises because of asymmetric information in insurance market.

E. Owners can avoid principal agent problem by designing contracts that give their agents incentive to perform better.

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q19UGC NET June 2025

Which of the following conditions are required for the set of consumers to exhibit parallel, straight wealth expansion paths at any price vector P?

A. Preferences admit indirect utility function of the Gorman form.

B. Preferences are heterogeneous

C. Wealth is equally distributed among all consumers.

D. All consumers have identical preferences that are homothetic.

E. All consumers have preferences that are quasilinear with respect to the same good.

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q20UGC NET June 2025

Which of the followings are true regarding the outcome of a consumer's optimization process.

A. The marginal utility per rupee spent on each good is the same.

B. The marginal rate of substitution between goods is equal to the ratio of the prices between the goods.

C. The consumer reaches the highest indifference curve in the indifference map.

D. The consumer indifference curve is tangent to his/her budget line.

E. From utility point of view, consumer is indifferent between any two points on his/her budget line.

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q21UGC NET June 2025

[Payoff matrix — Player 1 rows, Player 2 columns; payoffs (Player 1, Player 2)]

Player 1 \ Player 2LR
T1, 50, 3
M2, 61, 4
B3, 72, 2

Which of the following statements are true about the above payoff matrix?

A. Player-1 has two strictly dominated strategies.

B. None of the strategies of player-2 are weakly dominated.

C. Strategy T weakly dominates strategy B.

D. Strategy M of Player-1 will never be used in Nash-equilibrium.

E. Strategy M strictly dominates strategy T.

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q22UGC NET June 2025

Which of the followings are true in case of externality?

A. In case of externality, all costs and benefits associated with the goods are not internalized by households and firms involved in buying and productions.

B. Presence of externality results either under production or over production of the good.

C. Market based decision making yields an efficient outcome in the presence of externality.

D. In case of negative externality, the marginal social cost is higher than marginal cost.

E. Well defined property right can solve the problem of externality.

Choose the most appropriate answer from the options given below :

Q23UGC NET June 2025

Match List-I with List-II :

List-IList-II
A. Playing each strategy with probabilityI. Nash equilibrium
B. Maximum payoff given the strategy of otherII. Grim trigger strategy
C. Long-run behaviorIII. Best response function
D. Period of punishment is infiniteIV. Mixed strategy

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q24UGC NET June 2025

Match List-I with List-II :

List-IList-II
A. Income elasticity greater than oneI. Substitute goods
B. Positive cross price elasticityII. Inferior goods
C. Downward sloping price consumption curve (PCC)III. Luxurious goods
D. Negative income effectIV. Relative elastic demand

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q25UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)

The Nash equilibrium of the following game

[Payoff matrix: rows = Player P-1 strategies A1, A2, A3; columns = Player P-2 strategies B1, B2, B3; entries (P-1 payoff, P-2 payoff)]

A1: (4, 2)(2, 1)(5, 0)
A2: (3, 5)(3, 2)(3, 4)
A3: (5, 2)(4, 4)(3, 1)

is given by :

Q26UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)

Suppose Q = 20/P and P ≤ 10, MC = 1 then profit maximising price and quantity will be :

Q27UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)

For the demand function of good x, Qd = f (Px, Py, M) the sum of own price elasticity, cross price elasticity and income elasticity of demand would be :

Q28UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)

Which of the following combinations of theorems and their subjects are correctly matched ?

(A) Modigliani - Miller theorem : Price of goods and real return to factor

(B) Dorfman - Steiner theorem : Advertisement expenditure

(C) Arrow's impossibility theorem : Social choice

(D) Stolper - Samuelson theorem : Capital structure

(E) Fishers separation theorem : Profit maximisation motivation

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q29UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)

Arrange the following items in order of their construction starting from the first stage to the last stage :

(A) Budget

(B) Utility analysis

(C) Demand curve analysis

(D) Indifference curve analysis

(E) Consumer's equilibrium

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q30UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)

Identify the correct statements from below :

(A) When price consumption curve (PCC) for a good is parallel to horizontal axis, the demand function for the good is unitary elastic.

(B) Given log D=α+β log y+γ log p then elasticity of log D with respect to log p is γ

(C) The condition for stability in simple Keynesian system is O<MPC<1

(D) The fixed cost curve is a rectangular hyperbola

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q31UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)Official key disputed

Consider the following statements :

(A) If a market generates a side effect or externality then the market solutions are inefficient.

(B) If a market is efficient, then the quantity produced in the market maximise both producer's and consumer's surplus.

(C) Consumer's surplus is the buyer's WTP minus the seller's cost.

(D) Smith's invisible hand concept implies that competitive market outcome generates equity among the members in the society.

(E) Competitive market equilibrium is Pareto efficient.

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q32UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)Official key disputed

Consider the following statements :

(A) MC schedule is obtained by subtracting successive values of TC only

(B) MC schedule is obtained by subtracting successive values of either TC or TVC

(C) MC schedule is obtained by substracting successive values of either TVC or TFC

(D) The area under the MC curve equals TC

(E) AVC equals AC minus AFC

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q33UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)

Match List - I with List - II.

List - IList - II
(A) Top beneficiary from Foreign exchange trading(I) John Von Neuman and Oscar Morgenstern
(B) Competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient(II) General equilibrium analysis
(C) Walras(III) London
(D) Game Theory(IV) First theorem of welfare economics

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q34UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)

Match List - I with List - II.

List - IList - II
(A) W.W. Leontief(I) Shadow Price
(B) Jan Tinbergen(II) Consumption Function
(C) J.M. Keynes(III) Price competition with homogenous products
(D) Joseph Bertrand(IV) Input-output model

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q35UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)

Match List - I with List - II.

List - IList - II
(A) Monopoly theory of distribution(I) Walker
(B) Theory of profit(II) Robinson
(C) Full cost pricing(III) Kalecki
(D) Modern theory of rent(IV) Hall and Hitch

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q36UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)
Passage / data

Consider the following diagram : Social Costs of Monolpoly Power

[Figure: Y-axis 'Rs./Q' (price per unit), X-axis 'Quantity'. A downward-sloping AR (demand) curve, an MR curve below it, and an upward-sloping MC curve. MR = MC at output Qm; the monopoly price Pm is read off the AR curve above Qm. AR = MC at output Qc with competitive price Pc. Rectangle A lies between Pm and Pc from the Y-axis to Qm. Triangle B lies between Pm and Pc to the right of Qm, under the AR curve, up to the point where AR meets MC at Qc. Triangle C lies below Pc, between Qm and Qc, above the MC curve.]

Here (i) X-axis measures quantity

(ii) Y-axis measures price per unit (Rs/Q)

(iii) Pc=competitive price

(iv) Pm= Monopoly price

(v) Qc=competitive output

(vi) Qm=monopoly output

Find out the consumer loss because of moving from competitive to monopoly price (from Pc to pm) from the following alternatives :

Q37UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)
Same passage / data as the previous question

Consider the following diagram : Social Costs of Monolpoly Power

[Figure: Y-axis 'Rs./Q' (price per unit), X-axis 'Quantity'. A downward-sloping AR (demand) curve, an MR curve below it, and an upward-sloping MC curve. MR = MC at output Qm; the monopoly price Pm is read off the AR curve above Qm. AR = MC at output Qc with competitive price Pc. Rectangle A lies between Pm and Pc from the Y-axis to Qm. Triangle B lies between Pm and Pc to the right of Qm, under the AR curve, up to the point where AR meets MC at Qc. Triangle C lies below Pc, between Qm and Qc, above the MC curve.]

Here (i) X-axis measures quantity

(ii) Y-axis measures price per unit (Rs/Q)

(iii) Pc=competitive price

(iv) Pm= Monopoly price

(v) Qc=competitive output

(vi) Qm=monopoly output

Choose the correct answer from the following alternatives :

Q38UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)
Same passage / data as the previous question

Consider the following diagram : Social Costs of Monolpoly Power

[Figure: Y-axis 'Rs./Q' (price per unit), X-axis 'Quantity'. A downward-sloping AR (demand) curve, an MR curve below it, and an upward-sloping MC curve. MR = MC at output Qm; the monopoly price Pm is read off the AR curve above Qm. AR = MC at output Qc with competitive price Pc. Rectangle A lies between Pm and Pc from the Y-axis to Qm. Triangle B lies between Pm and Pc to the right of Qm, under the AR curve, up to the point where AR meets MC at Qc. Triangle C lies below Pc, between Qm and Qc, above the MC curve.]

Here (i) X-axis measures quantity

(ii) Y-axis measures price per unit (Rs/Q)

(iii) Pc=competitive price

(iv) Pm= Monopoly price

(v) Qc=competitive output

(vi) Qm=monopoly output

As a result of higher price, the producer gains and at the same time loses by amount respectively as shown below :

Find out the correct answer from the following alternatives :

Q39UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)
Same passage / data as the previous question

Consider the following diagram : Social Costs of Monolpoly Power

[Figure: Y-axis 'Rs./Q' (price per unit), X-axis 'Quantity'. A downward-sloping AR (demand) curve, an MR curve below it, and an upward-sloping MC curve. MR = MC at output Qm; the monopoly price Pm is read off the AR curve above Qm. AR = MC at output Qc with competitive price Pc. Rectangle A lies between Pm and Pc from the Y-axis to Qm. Triangle B lies between Pm and Pc to the right of Qm, under the AR curve, up to the point where AR meets MC at Qc. Triangle C lies below Pc, between Qm and Qc, above the MC curve.]

Here (i) X-axis measures quantity

(ii) Y-axis measures price per unit (Rs/Q)

(iii) Pc=competitive price

(iv) Pm= Monopoly price

(v) Qc=competitive output

(vi) Qm=monopoly output

Because of higher price (From Pc to Pm), find out the producer gains (producer surplus) from the following alternatives.

Q40UGC NET June 2024 (re-exam)
Same passage / data as the previous question

Consider the following diagram : Social Costs of Monolpoly Power

[Figure: Y-axis 'Rs./Q' (price per unit), X-axis 'Quantity'. A downward-sloping AR (demand) curve, an MR curve below it, and an upward-sloping MC curve. MR = MC at output Qm; the monopoly price Pm is read off the AR curve above Qm. AR = MC at output Qc with competitive price Pc. Rectangle A lies between Pm and Pc from the Y-axis to Qm. Triangle B lies between Pm and Pc to the right of Qm, under the AR curve, up to the point where AR meets MC at Qc. Triangle C lies below Pc, between Qm and Qc, above the MC curve.]

Here (i) X-axis measures quantity

(ii) Y-axis measures price per unit (Rs/Q)

(iii) Pc=competitive price

(iv) Pm= Monopoly price

(v) Qc=competitive output

(vi) Qm=monopoly output

Dead weight loss from the monopoly power is one of the following alternatives. Choose the correct one :

Q41UGC NET December 2023

Consider a production function q = x + y, where x and y are the 2 inputs. If the respective input prices are wx and wy and assume wx > wy. Then the cost function C(q) is :

Q42UGC NET December 2023

Suppose a cost function of producing q level of output in C(w, r, q) where C(w, r, q) = q(w/α + r/β), where w and r are the wage cost and rental cost of the 2 inputs capital (K) and labour (l) respectively. What would be the production function q of k and l ?

Q43UGC NET December 2023

Suppose a consumer has a utility function u(x) = 10√x, where x is the money income of the consumer. Suppose the consumer's initial endowment is Rs 50. Suppose she may suffer a loss of Rs 25 with a probability of 0.5 for some random event. Suppose she pays p premium for an insurance policy that fully reimburses her if she suffers a loss. How much premium p would she be willing to pay to insure against the loss ?

Q44UGC NET December 2023Official key disputed

Consider a consumer's choice based on only 2 commodities i.e., X ∈ R²₊, where X is a set of all commodity bundles which the consumer can conceive of. Suppose x and y are the 2 different commodity bundles and the budget set B of the consumer can be written as :

B = {(x, y): p1x + p2y ≤ M}; xi > 0, i = 1, 2. Which of the following statements is true ?

Q45UGC NET December 2023

Consider a Bertrand duopoly where the 2 firms produce a homogenous product. Assume the market demand curve is y = y1 + y2 = 1 − p, where p is the relevant market price, y is the total amount demanded at that price, y1 and y2 are the output levels of firm (1) and (2) respectively. Assume that the firm's cost functions are C(yi) = ½yi for i = 1, 2. The rules of the pricing game are as follows : Each firm must simultaneously quote a price in the interval [0, 1]. If the prices are different, the firm with the lower price sells all the units demanded at that price. If they quote the same price, the amount demanded at that price is splited equally between the two firms. What would be the Nash equilibrium price and quantities ?

Q46UGC NET December 2023

Suppose the cost function C(w1, w2, y) = y(w1 + √(w1w2) + w2), where w1 and w2 are the prices of 2 inputs which are used in production of y. Which of the following properties of the cost function C(w1, w2, y) is correct ?

Q47UGC NET December 2023

Consider the pay offs of two players, who are close friends. They can either go for Diwali shopping or they can watch World Cup Cricket match.

[Payoff table: columns = Player 1 (Diwali Shopping, World Cup Watching); rows = Player 2]

Player 2 Diwali Shopping: (2, 1)(0, 0)
Player 2 World Cup Watching: (0, 0)(1, 2)

Identify which of the following is true for them :

Q48UGC NET December 2023

In case of two perfect complement goods, which following statement is not true ?

Q49UGC NET December 2023

In a market for labour's demand and supply, the equilibrium wage is w*. The government fixes a minimum wage at w′. Which of the following statements is true ?

Q50UGC NET December 2023

In the given figure, DD is the demand curve and SS is the supply curve in a market. Choose the right answer from the following.

[Figure: P on the vertical axis, Q on the horizontal axis. DD is a downward-sloping straight line. SS is a curve that rises from S near the price axis, bends back (backward-bending) and comes down to S. DD and SS intersect twice: at E2 (high price P2, small quantity) and at E1 (low price P1, larger quantity).]

Q51UGC NET December 2023Official key disputed

The following are five statements about short run cost curves.

(A) The Marginal Cost (MC) curve cuts both short run Average Cost (AC) curve and Average Variable Cost (AVC) curve at their lowest point.

(B) The MC curve cuts AC curve from below, but nothing can be said about AVC curve.

(C) The distance between Total Cost (TC) curve and Total Variable Cost (TVC) curve gets reduced as quantity increases.

(D) The Average Fixed Cost (AFC) curve is asymptotic to the cost axis.

(E) The AC curve is u-shaped.

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q52UGC NET December 2023Dropped by NTA

Consider the following statements :

Assume a consumer's choice is based on only 2 commodities i.e., X ∈ R²₊, where X is the set of an possible commodities which a consumer can conceive of :

(A) Monotonicity of preference implies strong monotonicity but not the other way round.

(B) A preference relation is monotone if for all commodity bundle x, y ∈ X, y ≥ x and y ≠ x; then y ≿ x.

(C) A preference relation (≿) on X is strongly monotone if for all commodity bundles x, y ∈ X, y ≫ x and y ≠ x; then y ≿ x.

(D) A preference which is locally non satiated must follow monotonicity and strong monotonicity.

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q53UGC NET December 2023

Consider the following statements :

(A) If the 2 utility functions u(x) and b(x) are related by u(x) = V(b(x)), where V′(·) > 0, then V(x) is a utility function representing the same preference as b(x).

(B) If the 2 utility functions represents the same preference, the solutions to the consumer's utility maximization problem are the same with the 2 utility function but the indirect utility functions are different.

(C) If the local non satiation assumption of preference is satisfied, any solution to the consumer's utility maximization problem satisfies the budget constraint with equality.

(D) If the indirect utility function of b(x) is homogenous of degree 0 then indirect utility function of u(x) = V(b(x)), where V′(·) > 0, is a homogenous function of degree 1.

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q54UGC NET December 2023

Match List - I with List - II.

List - IList - II
(A) Kenneth Arrow(I) Analysis of causal relationship
(B) Robert Solow(II) Fundamental contribution in behavioural economics
(C) Daniel Kahneman(III) Fundamental contribution in welfare economics
(D) Joshua Angrist(IV) Fundamental contribution in economic growth theory

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q55UGC NET December 2023

Match List - I with List - II.

List - IList - II
(A) Shephard's Lemma(I) Hidden types of agent
(B) Adverse Selection(II) Envelope theorem
(C) Hotelling Lemma(III) Indirect utility function
(D) Roy's Identity(IV) Profit function

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Q56UGC NET December 2023
Passage / data

Assume that there are 2 firms producing steel. There is a negative externality due to production causing pollution. Firm 1's output is q1 and firm 2's is q2. Assume that the market price for steel is Ps = 1. Now consider two scenarios :

Scenario 1 : Assume that firm 1's cost function is C1(q1) = q1² and firm 2's cost function is C2(q2, q1) = (q2 + 0.75q1)². In short, firm 1's production is not affected by firm 2 but firm 2's production is affected by firm 1, i.e., Firms 1's operation causes firm 2's costs to rise.

Scenario 2 : Assume that negative externality works both ways i.e. both the firms face the adverse impact. So assume C1(q1, q2) = (q1 + 0.75q2)² and C2(q1, q2) = (q2 + 0.75q1)², i.e., Firms 1's operation causes firm 2's costs to rise and vice versa.

What is the equilibrium profit of firm 2 (π2) in the short run, in Scenario 1 ?

Q57UGC NET December 2023Official key disputed
Same passage / data as the previous question

Assume that there are 2 firms producing steel. There is a negative externality due to production causing pollution. Firm 1's output is q1 and firm 2's is q2. Assume that the market price for steel is Ps = 1. Now consider two scenarios :

Scenario 1 : Assume that firm 1's cost function is C1(q1) = q1² and firm 2's cost function is C2(q2, q1) = (q2 + 0.75q1)². In short, firm 1's production is not affected by firm 2 but firm 2's production is affected by firm 1, i.e., Firms 1's operation causes firm 2's costs to rise.

Scenario 2 : Assume that negative externality works both ways i.e. both the firms face the adverse impact. So assume C1(q1, q2) = (q1 + 0.75q2)² and C2(q1, q2) = (q2 + 0.75q1)², i.e., Firms 1's operation causes firm 2's costs to rise and vice versa.

What is the long run profit of firm 1 (π1), in Scenario 1 ?

Q58UGC NET December 2023
Same passage / data as the previous question

Assume that there are 2 firms producing steel. There is a negative externality due to production causing pollution. Firm 1's output is q1 and firm 2's is q2. Assume that the market price for steel is Ps = 1. Now consider two scenarios :

Scenario 1 : Assume that firm 1's cost function is C1(q1) = q1² and firm 2's cost function is C2(q2, q1) = (q2 + 0.75q1)². In short, firm 1's production is not affected by firm 2 but firm 2's production is affected by firm 1, i.e., Firms 1's operation causes firm 2's costs to rise.

Scenario 2 : Assume that negative externality works both ways i.e. both the firms face the adverse impact. So assume C1(q1, q2) = (q1 + 0.75q2)² and C2(q1, q2) = (q2 + 0.75q1)², i.e., Firms 1's operation causes firm 2's costs to rise and vice versa.

What is the long run profit of firm 2 (π2), in Scenario 1 ?

Q59UGC NET December 2023
Same passage / data as the previous question

Assume that there are 2 firms producing steel. There is a negative externality due to production causing pollution. Firm 1's output is q1 and firm 2's is q2. Assume that the market price for steel is Ps = 1. Now consider two scenarios :

Scenario 1 : Assume that firm 1's cost function is C1(q1) = q1² and firm 2's cost function is C2(q2, q1) = (q2 + 0.75q1)². In short, firm 1's production is not affected by firm 2 but firm 2's production is affected by firm 1, i.e., Firms 1's operation causes firm 2's costs to rise.

Scenario 2 : Assume that negative externality works both ways i.e. both the firms face the adverse impact. So assume C1(q1, q2) = (q1 + 0.75q2)² and C2(q1, q2) = (q2 + 0.75q1)², i.e., Firms 1's operation causes firm 2's costs to rise and vice versa.

What would be the market equilibrium profit of the 2 firms, in Scenario 2 ?

Q60UGC NET December 2023Official key disputed
Same passage / data as the previous question

Assume that there are 2 firms producing steel. There is a negative externality due to production causing pollution. Firm 1's output is q1 and firm 2's is q2. Assume that the market price for steel is Ps = 1. Now consider two scenarios :

Scenario 1 : Assume that firm 1's cost function is C1(q1) = q1² and firm 2's cost function is C2(q2, q1) = (q2 + 0.75q1)². In short, firm 1's production is not affected by firm 2 but firm 2's production is affected by firm 1, i.e., Firms 1's operation causes firm 2's costs to rise.

Scenario 2 : Assume that negative externality works both ways i.e. both the firms face the adverse impact. So assume C1(q1, q2) = (q1 + 0.75q2)² and C2(q1, q2) = (q2 + 0.75q1)², i.e., Firms 1's operation causes firm 2's costs to rise and vice versa.

Do you think that the equilibrium outcome for Scenario 2 is inefficient ? How would be the efficiency be restored ?