"Statistically speaking, men who eat more bananas are more likely to be in committed relations. So start eating more bananas". Which of the following fallacies is committed in the above argument ?
Paper 1 · Unit 6
Logical Reasoning
Revision notes (13 min read), then 13 real questions from UGC NET papers.
Official syllabus · Unit 6
- Understanding the structure of arguments: argument forms, structure of categorical propositions, mood and figure, formal and informal fallacies, uses of language, connotations and denotations of terms, classical square of opposition
- Evaluating and distinguishing deductive and inductive reasoning
- Analogies
- Venn diagram: simple and multiple use for establishing validity of arguments
- Indian logic: means of knowledge
- Pramanas: Pratyaksha (perception), Anumana (inference), Upamana (comparison), Shabda (verbal testimony), Arthapatti (implication) and Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension)
- Structure and kinds of Anumana (inference), Vyapti (invariable relation), Hetvabhasas (fallacies of inference)
Verbatim from the UGC NET Bureau syllabus.
How often it is asked
| Paper | Questions |
|---|---|
| December 20257 Jan 2026 | 5 / 50 |
| June 202529 Jun 2025 | 3 / 50 |
| June 2024 (re-exam)28 Aug 2024 | 5 / 50 |
Average 4.3 questions (9 marks) per paper. Unit tagging is ours.
Syllabus bullets: structure of arguments (argument forms, categorical propositions, mood and figure, formal and informal fallacies, uses of language, connotation and denotation, classical square of opposition) · deductive vs inductive reasoning · analogies · Venn diagrams for validity · Indian logic: means of knowledge; pramanas (pratyaksha, anumana, upamana, shabda, arthapatti, anupalabdhi); structure and kinds of anumana, vyapti, hetvabhasas. Western logic follows Copi, Cohen & McMahon, Introduction to Logic; Indian logic follows the Nyaya tradition (Nyaya-sutra, Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha) and standard surveys (SEP, IEP).
A. Western logic
1. Argument basics
- Argument = premises offered in support of a conclusion. Premise indicators: since, because, for, given that. Conclusion indicators: therefore, hence, thus, so, consequently.
- Deductive: claims conclusion follows necessarily → valid/invalid; valid + all premises true = sound.
- Inductive: claims conclusion is probable → strong/weak; strong + true premises = cogent.
- Validity is about form, not truth: a valid argument can have false premises and a false conclusion; the only impossible combination is true premises + false conclusion.
| Deductive | Inductive |
|---|---|
| General → particular (typically) | Particular → general (typically) |
| Conclusion contains no more than premises | Conclusion goes beyond premises (ampliative) |
| Valid/invalid; certainty | Strong/weak; probability |
| Adding premises cannot make a valid argument invalid | New evidence can weaken it |
| Mathematics, syllogism | Generalisation, analogy, causal and statistical reasoning |
Mill's methods of causal inference (A System of Logic, 1843): agreement, difference, joint method of agreement and difference, residues, concomitant variation.
2. Valid and invalid argument forms (propositional)
| Valid | Form | Invalid look-alike |
|---|---|---|
| Modus ponens | p → q, p ∴ q | Affirming the consequent: p → q, q ∴ p |
| Modus tollens | p → q, ¬q ∴ ¬p | Denying the antecedent: p → q, ¬p ∴ ¬q |
| Hypothetical syllogism | p → q, q → r ∴ p → r | — |
| Disjunctive syllogism | p ∨ q, ¬p ∴ q | Affirming a disjunct (for inclusive "or") |
| Constructive dilemma | (p → q)·(r → s), p ∨ r ∴ q ∨ s | — |
Equivalences: p → q ≡ ¬q → ¬p (contrapositive) ≡ ¬p ∨ q. ¬(p·q) ≡ ¬p ∨ ¬q; ¬(p ∨ q) ≡ ¬p·¬q (De Morgan).
3. Categorical propositions
| Form | Statement | Quantity | Quality | Distributed term(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | All S are P | Universal | Affirmative | S only |
| E | No S is P | Universal | Negative | S and P |
| I | Some S are P | Particular | Affirmative | None |
| O | Some S are not P | Particular | Negative | P only |
Mnemonics: AffIrmo (A, I affirmative), nEgO (E, O negative). Distribution: "Unprepared Students Never Pass" — Universals distribute the Subject; Negatives distribute the Predicate.
4. Classical (Aristotelian) square of opposition
| Relation | Pair | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Contradictories | A–O, E–I | Exactly one true, one false |
| Contraries | A–E | Cannot both be true; can both be false |
| Subcontraries | I–O | Cannot both be false; can both be true |
| Subalternation | A→I, E→O | Truth flows down (universal true ⇒ particular true); falsity flows up (particular false ⇒ universal false) |
Truth-value table (traditional square):
| Given | A | E | I | O |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A true | T | F | T | F |
| A false | F | ? | ? | T |
| E true | F | T | F | T |
| E false | ? | F | T | ? |
| I true | ? | F | T | ? |
| I false | F | T | F | T |
| O true | F | ? | ? | T |
| O false | T | F | T | F |
(? = undetermined). In the modern Boolean square (no existential import), only the contradictory relations remain.
5. Immediate inferences
| Operation | How | Valid for |
|---|---|---|
| Conversion | Swap S and P | E, I (A only "by limitation" to I in traditional logic; O never) |
| Obversion | Change quality + replace P by non-P | All four (A→E, E→A, I→O, O→I) |
| Contraposition | Swap S and P, replace both by complements | A, O (E only by limitation) |
E.g., obverse of "All S are P" = "No S is non-P"; contrapositive = "All non-P are non-S".
6. Categorical syllogism: terms, mood, figure
- Major term = predicate of conclusion (P); minor term = subject of conclusion (S); middle term (M) appears in both premises, not in conclusion. Major premise contains P; standard order: major premise, minor premise, conclusion.
- Mood = the letters of the three propositions in standard order (e.g., AAA, EIO). Figure = position of M:
| Figure | Major premise | Minor premise | Mnemonic |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M – P | S – M | "Sub-pre" (M subject then predicate) |
| 2 | P – M | S – M | M predicate twice |
| 3 | M – P | M – S | M subject twice |
| 4 | P – M | M – S | Mirror of 1 |
- 64 moods × 4 figures = 256 forms. 15 unconditionally valid (Boolean): Fig 1 AAA (Barbara), EAE (Celarent), AII (Darii), EIO (Ferio); Fig 2 EAE (Cesare), AEE (Camestres), EIO (Festino), AOO (Baroco); Fig 3 IAI (Disamis), AII (Datisi), OAO (Bocardo), EIO (Ferison); Fig 4 AEE (Camenes), IAI (Dimaris), EIO (Fresison). With existential import (traditional), 24 forms are valid.
7. Rules of the syllogism and formal fallacies
| Rule | Fallacy if broken |
|---|---|
| Exactly three terms, used in the same sense | Four terms (quaternio terminorum) — often via equivocation |
| Middle term distributed at least once | Undistributed middle |
| Term distributed in conclusion must be distributed in its premise | Illicit major / illicit minor |
| No two negative premises | Exclusive premises |
| A negative premise requires a negative conclusion (and vice versa) | Affirmative conclusion from a negative premise / negative conclusion from affirmative premises |
| (Boolean) Two universal premises cannot yield a particular conclusion | Existential fallacy |
Worked: "All poets are dreamers; some dreamers are teachers; ∴ some teachers are poets" → M = dreamers, undistributed in both (predicate of A, terms of I) → undistributed middle, invalid.
8. Venn diagram test (three overlapping circles S, P, M)
- Diagram universal premises first: shade the empty region(s).
- Then particular premises: put an X in the region that must be non-empty; if X could fall in two unshaded regions, place it on the line.
- The argument is valid iff the conclusion is already shown — do not draw the conclusion separately. Simple-statement questions ("All A are B; some B are C — which follows?") use the same logic: choose only what is true in every possible diagram; check "either–or" pairs (complementary pairs such as "Some A are C / No A is C").
9. Informal fallacies (Copi & Cohen grouping)
| Group | Fallacies |
|---|---|
| Relevance | Appeal to the populace (ad populum), appeal to emotion, to pity (ad misericordiam), to force (ad baculum), argument against the person (ad hominem: abusive, circumstantial, tu quoque), red herring, straw man, irrelevant conclusion (ignoratio elenchi) |
| Defective induction | Appeal to ignorance (ad ignorantiam), appeal to inappropriate authority (ad verecundiam), false cause (post hoc ergo propter hoc, non causa pro causa, slippery slope), hasty generalisation (converse accident) |
| Presumption | Accident, complex question (loaded question), begging the question (petitio principii/circular argument) |
| Ambiguity | Equivocation (word shifts meaning), amphiboly (grammatical ambiguity), accent, composition (parts → whole), division (whole → parts) |
10. Uses of language; connotation and denotation; definitions
- Uses of language (Copi): informative (true/false claims), expressive (feelings), directive (commands, requests); also ceremonial and performative ("I promise", "I resign").
- Denotation (extension) = the class of objects a term applies to. Connotation (intension) = the attributes shared by those objects. As intension increases, extension decreases (law of inverse variation, with exceptions for empty terms).
- Kinds of definition: stipulative, lexical, precising, theoretical, persuasive. Techniques: extensional (ostensive, enumerative, by subclass) and intensional (synonymous, operational, genus and difference — best for lexical).
11. Analogies
- Verbal analogy relations: synonym, antonym, part–whole, cause–effect, worker–tool, worker–product, raw material–product, degree/intensity, function, symbol–meaning, unit–quantity (e.g., Ohm : Resistance :: Ampere : Current).
- Analogical argument (inductive): strength depends on (Copi's criteria) number of entities, variety among them, number of similarities, relevance of similarities, disanalogies, modesty of conclusion.
B. Indian logic (Nyaya-centred)
12. Pramana — means of valid knowledge
- Prama = valid knowledge; pramata = knower; prameya = object known; pramana = means of valid knowledge. Aprama (invalid cognition): doubt (samshaya), error (viparyaya), hypothetical reasoning (tarka).
| Pramana | Meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Pratyaksha (perception) | Knowledge from sense–object contact | Seeing a pot |
| Anumana (inference) | Knowledge via a mark (linga/hetu) invariably related to what is inferred | Fire inferred from smoke |
| Upamana (comparison) | Knowledge of the relation between a name and its object from similarity | Told "a gavaya is like a cow", a forest-goer identifies a gavaya |
| Shabda (verbal testimony) | Statement of a reliable person (apta); laukika (secular) and vaidika (scriptural) | Learning facts from an expert |
| Arthapatti (postulation/implication) | Assuming a fact to explain an otherwise inexplicable fact | "Fat Devadatta does not eat by day" → he eats at night |
| Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) | Direct knowledge of absence | Knowing "there is no pot on the floor" |
Pramanas accepted by schools (standard textbook list):
| No. | Schools | Pramanas |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Charvaka | Pratyaksha only |
| 2 | Buddhism, Vaisheshika | Pratyaksha, Anumana |
| 3 | Sankhya, Yoga (also commonly Jainism, Vishishtadvaita) | + Shabda |
| 4 | Nyaya | + Upamana |
| 5 | Prabhakara Mimamsa | + Arthapatti |
| 6 | Bhatta Mimamsa, Advaita Vedanta | + Anupalabdhi |
(Jaina epistemology formally divides pramana into pratyaksha and paroksha; exam lists usually give it three.)
- Kinds of pratyaksha: nirvikalpaka (indeterminate, non-conceptual) vs savikalpaka (determinate, conceptual); laukika (ordinary: five external senses + manas) vs alaukika (extraordinary: samanya-lakshana — of a universal through an instance; jnana-lakshana — via memory, e.g., "fragrant sandalwood" seen; yogaja — yogic).
- Shabda — conditions of a meaningful sentence: akanksha (expectancy), yogyata (compatibility), sannidhi/asatti (proximity), tatparya (intention).
13. Anumana — structure
- Terms: paksha (subject/minor term: the hill) · sadhya (what is to be proved/major term: fire) · hetu/linga/sadhana (reason/middle term: smoke) · vyapti (invariable concomitance between hetu and sadhya) · paramarsha (consideration: "the hill has smoke pervaded by fire") — the immediate cause of inferential knowledge.
- Sapaksha = similar instance where sadhya is known to be present (kitchen); vipaksha = dissimilar instance where sadhya is known to be absent (lake).
- Marks of a valid hetu: Buddhist (Dignaga) trairupya — (1) pakshadharmata (present in paksha), (2) sapakshe sattvam (present in sapaksha), (3) vipakshe asattvam (absent from vipaksha). Nyaya adds (4) abadhitatva (not contradicted) and (5) asatpratipakshatva (not counter-balanced) = five marks.
Five-membered (parartha) syllogism — panchavayava:
| # | Member | Example |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pratijna (proposition) | The hill has fire. |
| 2 | Hetu (reason) | Because it has smoke. |
| 3 | Udaharana (example + universal rule) | Whatever has smoke has fire, as in a kitchen. |
| 4 | Upanaya (application) | The hill has smoke, invariably accompanied by fire. |
| 5 | Nigamana (conclusion) | Therefore, the hill has fire. |
(Comparison: Aristotle's syllogism has three propositions; the Indian form adds an example — it is deductive-inductive. Mimamsa/Vedanta accept 3 members — either the first three or the last three.)
14. Kinds of anumana
| Basis | Kinds |
|---|---|
| Purpose | Svarthanumana (for oneself; no formal members) · Pararthanumana (for others; five members). Explicit distinction associated with Dignaga, adopted by Nyaya |
| Old Nyaya (Nyaya-sutra 1.1.5) | Purvavat (from cause to effect: dark clouds → rain) · Sheshavat (from effect to cause: swollen river → rain upstream) · Samanyatodrishta (from general observation, not causal: the sun's change of position → it moves) |
| Navya-Nyaya (by vyapti) | Kevalanvayi (only positive concomitance) · Kevalavyatireki (only negative) · Anvaya-vyatireki (both — e.g., smoke–fire) |
15. Vyapti
- Invariable, unconditional (nirupadhika) concomitance of hetu with sadhya: "wherever there is smoke there is fire".
- Anvaya-vyapti (agreement in presence): where smoke, there fire. Vyatireka-vyapti (agreement in absence): where no fire, no smoke.
- Sama-vyapti (equal extension, both ways) vs vishama-vyapti (unequal: smoke→fire but not fire→smoke).
- Established by: anvaya, vyatireka, non-observation of contrary instance (vyabhicharagraha), elimination of conditions (upadhi-nirasa), tarka, and samanya-lakshana perception. Upadhi = an extra condition (e.g., wet fuel) — vyapti must be free from it.
16. Hetvabhasa — fallacies of inference (five, Nyaya)
| # | Name (alternative) | Defect | Classic example |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Savyabhichara (anaikantika, irregular) | Hetu is not invariably with sadhya. Sub-types: sadharana (too wide), asadharana (too narrow), anupasamhari (non-conclusive) | "The hill has fire because it is knowable" (sadharana); "Sound is eternal because it is audible" (asadharana) |
| 2 | Viruddha (contradictory) | Hetu proves the opposite of the sadhya | "Sound is eternal because it is produced" |
| 3 | Satpratipaksha (prakaranasama, counter-balanced) | An equally strong hetu proves the contrary | "Sound is eternal because audible" vs "Sound is non-eternal because produced" |
| 4 | Asiddha (sadhyasama, unproved) | Hetu itself is not established. Sub-types: ashrayasiddha (paksha unreal), svarupasiddha (hetu absent from paksha), vyapyatvasiddha (vyapti conditional) | "The sky-lotus is fragrant because it is a lotus" (ashrayasiddha); "Sound is a quality because it is visible" (svarupasiddha) |
| 5 | Badhita (kalatyayapadishta/kalatita, contradicted) | Sadhya is contradicted by a stronger pramana (e.g., perception) | "Fire is cold because it is a substance" |
Mnemonic: "SaVi-SaA-Ba" — Savyabhichara, Viruddha, Satpratipaksha, Asiddha, Badhita.
Frequently asked in PYQs (2019–2025)
- Square of opposition: "If A is true / O is false, which follows?"; contrary vs subcontrary.
- Distribution of terms; mood and figure identification; undistributed middle / illicit major.
- Two- or three-statement syllogisms with Venn diagrams ("which conclusions follow?").
- Informal fallacies matching (ad hominem, ad verecundiam, petitio principii, composition).
- Deductive vs inductive features; uses of language; connotation/denotation.
- Indian logic: pramanas accepted by schools; arthapatti/anupalabdhi examples; five members of syllogism in order; hetvabhasa matching; paksha/sadhya/hetu identification; vyapti.
- Verbal analogies (1 question most shifts).
Sources
- UGC NET Paper I syllabus — https://www.ugcnetonline.in/syllabus-new.php
- Copi, I. M., Cohen, C. & McMahon, K. (2014). Introduction to Logic, 14th ed. Pearson (categorical propositions, square, syllogistic rules and fallacies, 15 valid forms, informal fallacy groups, uses of language, definitions, analogical criteria).
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Traditional Square of Opposition" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square/
- SEP, "Fallacies" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/ ; SEP, "Aristotle's Logic" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/
- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Nyāya" (pramanas, five-membered syllogism, svartha/parartha, three-fold inference, five pseudo-reasons, extraordinary perception) — https://iep.utm.edu/nyaya/
- SEP, "Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy" — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-india/
- Annambhatta, Tarkasamgraha (with Dipika), trans. Gopinath Bhattacharya; Chatterjee, S. & Datta, D. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Univ. of Calcutta) — pramanas by school, kinds of anumana, hetvabhasa sub-types.
- Mill, J. S. (1843). A System of Logic.
- PYQ trend analyses — https://www.pw.live/ugc-net/exams/ugc-net-exam-analysis-31st-december-2025 ; https://lawsikho.com/blog/ugc-net-paper-1-important-topics/
Practice: 13 real questions
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Given below are two statements : one is labelled as Assertion (A) and the other is labelled as Reason (R).
Assertion (A) : As per classical Indian school of logic the argument 'the sky-Lotus is fragrant, because it is a Lotus, like the Lotus of a Lake' is fallacious.
Reason (R) : In the above argument the middle term is non exclusive.
In the light of the above statements, choose the most appropriate answer from the options given below :
Arrange the following terms in order of increasing extension.
A. Lotus
B. Plant
C. Organism
D. Flower
Choose the correct answer from the options given below :
Which of the following statement are logically equivalent ?
A. No cars are non-vehicles
B. Some cars are vehicles
C. All vehicles are cars
D. All cars are vehicles
Choose the correct answer from the options given below :
Which of the following propositions are so related that they cannot both be true although they may both be false ?
A. All cars are vehicles.
B. Some cars are vehicles.
C. No cars are vehicles.
D. Some cars are not vehicles.
Choose the correct answer from the options given below :
Match List - I with List - II :
| List - I | List - II |
|---|---|
| A. Ad hominem | I. Mistaking correlation for causation |
| B. Straw man | II. Attacking the person instead of issue |
| C. False cause | III. Misrepresenting someone's argument |
| D. Red Herring | IV. Diverting attention to another issue |
Choose the correct answer from the options given below :
The fallacy where the conclusion does not logically follow from the premises is called :
Which of the following are valid deductive forms of reasoning ?
A. Modus Ponens
B. Modus Tollens
C. Hypothetical syllogism
D. Argument from analogy
Choose the most appropriate answer from the options given below :
"If Anup is a member of Animal Rights Society, then he opposes horse racing. Anup opposes horse racing, therefore, he is a member of Animal Rights Society". Which fallacy is committed in the above argument ?
If the statement-"No squares are circles" is given as true, which of the following statements can be immediately inferred to be false.
(A) Some circles are not squares
(B) All squares are circles
(C) Some squares are circles
(D) Some squares are not circles
Choose the correct answer from the options given below :
Which of the following two propositions can neither be both true together nor can they be false together ?
(A) All squares are rectangles
(B) Some squares are rectangles
(C) No squares are rectangles
(D) Some square are not rectangles
Choose the correct answer from the options given below :
From the following identify the propositions that are logically equivalent.
(A) No plants are animals.
(B) No animals are plants.
(C) All plants are non-animals.
(D) All non-animals are plants.
Choose the correct answer from the options given below :
As per classical Indian School of Logic (Nyāya), verbal testimony (śabda pramāna) includes :
(A) Only injunctive sentences
(B) Words of a scripture
(C) Words of any teacher
(D) Words of a trustworthy person
Choose the correct answer from the options given below :